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                                               NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
                                 
             IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                     FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                          ____________ 
                                 
                          No. 01-1289 
                          ____________ 
                                 
          STEVEN C. STAFFORD,  
                                                  Appellant  
                                                  v.  
          EI DUPONT DE NEMOURS, Plan Administrator;  
                                                  Appellee  
          HOSPITAL AND MEDICAL-SURGICAL PLAN; DENTAL 
          ASSISTANCE PLAN; NONCONTRIBUTORY GROUP LIFE 
          INSURANCE PLAN; CONTRIBUTORY GROUP LIFE INSURANCE 
          PLAN; TOTAL AND PERMANENT DISABILITY INCOME PLAN; 
          SHORT TERM DISABILITY PLAN  
                          ____________ 
                                 
          Appeal from the United States District Court 
                  For the District of Delaware 
                     D.C. No.: 98-cv-00086 
         District Judge: Honorable Roderick R. McKelvie 
                          ____________ 
                                 
   Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) January 18, 2002 
                                 
Before: SCIRICA, ROSENN, Circuit Judge, and KANE, District Judge. 
                                 
                   (Filed:  January 24, 2002) 
                          ___________ 
                                 
                       MEMORANDUM OPINION 
                          ____________ 
                                 
                                 
ROSENN, Circuit Judge. 
     Steven Stafford (Stafford) was employed by E.I. Du Pont De Nemours 
and 
Company (Du Pont) from January 1984 through September 1993.  Stafford sued 
in the 
United States District Court for the District of Delaware under the 
Employee Retirement 
Income Security Act (ERISA)  502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C.  1132(a)(1)(B) and 
ERISA  
502(a)(3), 29 U.S.C.  1132(a)(3), alleging that Du Pont denied him 
disability benefits 
due him under Du Pont's Total and Permanent Disability Income Plan (T&P 
plan).  The 
District Court granted summary judgment in favor of Du Pont.  Stafford 
timely appealed.  
We affirm. 
                                I. 
     Because the parties are fully familiar with the facts, we briefly 
summarize only the 
most pertinent.  Since we are reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we 
view those 
facts in the light most favorable to Stafford.  Pa. Coal Ass'n v. Babbitt, 
63 F.3d 231, 236 
(3d Cir. 1995).   
     Du Pont terminated Stafford's employment in September 1993.  In July 
1994, 
Stafford submitted an application for T&P plan benefits.  Generally, an 
employee is 
eligible for Du Pont's T&P plan benefits if that person is, while a Du 
Pont employee, 
"totally disabled by injuries or disease and presumably will be totally 
and permanently 
prevented from pursuing any gainful occupation."  In support of his 
application, Stafford 
submitted medical records revealing that he suffered from hypertension 
(i.e., high blood 
pressure) which was being treated by medication.  Nothing in the July 1994 
application 
suggested that Stafford had been disabled in September 1993, when he was 
terminated. 
     Following an extensive review by Du Pont's Board of Benefits and 
Pensions 
(Board), Du Pont denied Stafford's application and so informed him by a 
letter dated 
October 13, 1994.  The letter informed Stafford that none of the medical 
evidence he 
provided showed that he "had a total and permanent impairment at the time 
of [] 
termination."  The letter also informed Stafford of his "right to appeal 
th[e] decision to 
the Board" pursuant to a procedure attached to the letter.  It further 
informed Stafford 
that to appeal successfully, he had to provide additional objective 
medical evidence of a 
total impairment of function.  The letter also enumerated some examples of 
such 
evidence.  On October 19, 1994, Stafford requested an appeal to the Board. 
     In due course, the Board's secretary wrote Stafford, informing him 
that the Board 
would review the previously submitted information and inviting him to 
submit any 
additional information helpful to his application.  Stafford submitted no 
new information.  
In December 1994, the Board denied Stafford's appeal and  informed him of 
the decision 
by letter dated December 27, 1994.     
     Approximately two and a half years later, on June 5, 1997, Stafford 
informed Du 
Pont that the Social Security Administration had determined that he had 
been disabled at 
the time of his termination in September 1993 and had awarded him Social 
Security 
disability benefits.  Du Pont informed Stafford that a Social Security 
disability award 
does not ipso facto qualify a person for T&P plan benefits.  Du Pont also 
advised him to 
submit new medical information in support of his claim, which would be 
reviewed to 
determine if it warranted reopening Stafford's case before the Board.  
Stafford submitted 
new medical records, but none suggested that he had been permanently 
disabled from 
working at the time of his termination in September 1993.  Therefore, in 
January 1998, 
Du Pont advised Stafford that it would not reopen his T&P plan 
application.  On 
February 23, 1998, Stafford filed this suit.        
                               II. 
     We exercise de novo review over the District Court's granting summary 
judgment.  
Id.  Summary judgment is proper when no material facts are in dispute and 
judgment can 
be entered as a matter of law.  Edelman v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 83 F.3d 
68, 70 (3d Cir. 
1996).  The applicability of a statute of limitations is a legal question 
and is likewise 
reviewed de novo.  Syed v. Hercules Inc., 214 F.3d 155, 159 n.2 (3d Cir. 
2000). 
     The District Court had two bases for granting summary judgment.  
First, it looked 
at Du Pont's rejection of Stafford's original 1994 application.  The Court 
ruled that there 
was a one-year statute of limitations vis-a-vis Stafford's 1994 
application, and that 
Stafford's challenge was therefore untimely.  The Court then separately 
looked at Du 
Pont's January 1998 rejection of Stafford's attempt to reopen his case, 
and ruled that 
such denial was not arbitrary and capricious.  Stafford, egregiously 
misapprehending the 
Court's ruling, believes that the District Court relied on the statute of 
limitations to reject 
both his original 1994 claim and his later attempt to reopen it.  Because 
the statute of 
limitations ruling is the only issue briefed by Stafford, it is the only 
issue this Court will 
address.  
      Stafford first argues that Du Pont did not assert a statute of 
limitations defense 
until after the formal briefing of the summary judgment motion and that Du 
Pont 
therefore waived the defense.  We first note that affirmative defenses, 
which include the 
statute of limitations, are not waived if raised at a "pragmatically 
sufficient time" with no 
prejudice to the plaintiff.  Eddy v. VI Water & Power Authority, 256 F.3d 
204, 209 (3d 
Cir. 2001) (internal quotations omitted).  Moreover, "issues tried by the 
express or 
implied consent of the parties are 'treated in all respects as if they had 
been raised in the 
pleadings.'"  Charpentier v. Godsil, 937 F.2d 859, 864 (3d Cir. 1991) 
(quoting Prinz v. 
Greate Bay Casino Corp., 705 F.2d 692, 694 (3d Cir. 1983)).  Here, 
Stafford met Du 
Pont's statute of limitations defense head-on in the District Court, 
without objection.  He 
had a full and fair opportunity to present his arguments, and he will not 
now be heard to 
raise an objection.   
     Stafford further appears to argue that since Du Pont's procedure 
allows employees 
to attempt to reopen their cases, his administrative remedies were never 
exhausted and 
the statute of limitations has not begun to run.  Weldon v. Kraft, Inc., 
896 F.2d 793, 800 
(3d Cir. 1990) (noting that federal courts normally will not hear an ERISA 
claim until the 
plaintiff has exhausted all remedies available under the plan).  
Stafford's position defies 
all logic.  If this Court adopted Stafford's theory, there would never be 
repose for an 
employer that procedurally allows for the reopening of a case.  A decade-
old finding of 
non-disability could then be judicially challenged simply by a plaintiff 
seeking to reopen 
the administrative process.  Allowing this would in turn create incentives 
for an employer 
not to allow any reopening of the administrative process, lest it face a 
perpetual risk of 
litigation.  See generally Martin v. Constr. Laborer's Pension Trust, 947 
F.2d 1381, 
1386-87 (9th Cir. 1991) (noting that tolling the statute of limitations 
under similar 
circumstances penalizes employers for giving employees' cases further 
consideration).   
     ERISA does not demand that an employer allow for reopening of closed 
cases.  In 
providing such a procedure, Du Pont acts benevolently, and we do not 
intend to 
discourage such benevolence.  Stafford's original claim accrued when the 
Board denied 
his appeal in December 1994.  Du Pont's unwillingness to reexamine 
Stafford's case in 
the event of new medical information in support of his claim has no effect 
on the 
applicable statute of limitations.  The statute of limitations began 
running in December 
1994, when the Board rejected Stafford's appeal.       
     Stafford cites Doe v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield United, 112 F.3d 869 
(7th Cir. 
1997), as support for tolling the statute of limitations.  The citation is 
inapposite.  Doe 
involved a defendant who asked the plaintiff to delay filing a suit in 
order to continue 
negotiations.  Id. at 876-77.  Nothing like that occurred here.  Du Pont 
merely 
encouraged Stafford to submit additional information beneficial to his 
claim, and 
informed him that his claim would be reevaluated if new information came 
to light.  Du 
Pont did nothing expressly or implicitly to discourage Stafford from 
timely seeking 
judicial redress.  Doe is therefore unavailing to Stafford. 
     Finally, Stafford cites Epright v. Envtl. Res. Mgmt., Inc. Health & 
Welfare Plan, 
81 F.3d 335 (3d Cir. 1996), for the proposition that when a letter denying 
benefits does 
not explain the proper steps for pursuing review of the denial, the plan's 
time bar for 
review is not triggered.  Id. at 342.  Of course, if the plan's time bar 
is not triggered, 
administrative review is not exhausted and the statute of limitations does 
not begin to 
run.  Weldon, 896 F.2d at 800.  Here, however, Du Pont provided Stafford 
all necessary 
information.  In the October 13, 1994, letter informing Stafford of the 
denial of his claim, 
Du Pont also advised him of his right to appeal to the Board, the proper 
procedure for 
taking such an appeal, and informed him that to successfully appeal, he 
had to submit 
additional objective medical evidence.  Du Pont explained to Stafford the 
proper steps 
for reviewing its denial of Stafford's application, and thus Epright is of 
no benefit to 
him.   
     Stafford also argues that a three-year statute of limitations is 
applicable to his 
claim, rather than the one-year statute applied by the District Court.  
This case is on all 
fours with Syed v. Hercules Inc, 214 F.3d 155 (3d Cir. 2000), which held 
that 
Delaware's one-year statute is applicable under these circumstances.  
Assuming 
arguendo that the three-year statute is applicable, Stafford's suit is 
still untimely.  
Stafford's claim accrued in December 1994.  Stafford filed suit on 
February 23, 1998, 
more than three years later.  Thus, under either statute of limitations, 
Stafford's efforts to 
reopen his 1994 claim is barred.   
                              III. 
     In summary, Stafford's February 1998 suit was untimely and the 
District Court 
committed no error in granting summary judgment in favor of Du Pont.  
Accordingly, the 
District Court's judgment is affirmed.  Each side to bear its own costs. 
 
                             
TO THE CLERK: 
 




                                            /S/ Max Rosenn                                
                                   Circuit Judge 
